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Case No. 20622 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
RAY C. JOHNSON and FRANCIS C. 
JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
- vs -
DONALD ROGERS and NEWSPAPER 
AGENCY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
000O000 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Donald Rogers ("Rogers"), adopts the state-
ment of the case recited by appellants, as supplemented by 
Newspaper Agency Corporation ("NAC"). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent, Rogers, objects to the factual statement 
rendered by the appellants. This statement reads more like a 
closing argument to be given at trial rather than a balanced, 
objective backdrop for the legal points in this case. Many 
statements are taken out of context, are incomplete and are 
countered by testimony of other witnesses. The factual picture 
of what was going on at the loading dock at NAC and who knew 
what - at what time - is, at best, muddled. Some of the facts 
are contested and will have to be resolved by the trier of 
fact. In spite of this, after reviewing all the facts, Judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Fishler found no contested issues of fact which precluded his 
issuance of summary judgment. All of this is not particularly 
relevant to Rogers for purposes of this appeal, however. The 
relevant facts as to him are that he was driving under the 
influence and did cause injury. Those facts are admitted. 
Otherwise, the Court is referred to the factual statement of 
NAC as a balance to the statement of appellants, with the excep-
tion of one procedural fact that relates to the issue of puni-
tive damages. Between Friends, the bar where Rogers had been 
drinking on the afternoon of the accident, was brought into 
this action by Third-Party Complaint, under the Dram Shop Act. 
Between Friends settled by paying $50,000.00. Also, NAC made 
an offer of judgment in the amount of $125,000.00. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1* Evidence of intoxication alone is insufficient to 
justify an award of punitive damages. 
2. Punitive damages are not recoverable where the defen-
dant has already been prosecuted criminally. 
3. Does Utah recognize a cause of action for emotional 
distress to one "within the zone of danger" who witnesses inju-
ry to another? 
4. If Utah does recognize such a cause of action, are 
the claims of Ray C. Johnson barred by Section 31-41-9, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended)? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent, Rogers, contends that, regardless of whether 
this Court adopts the actual malice standard for punitive damag-
es as asserted by NAC, or the lesser standard urged by appel-
lants, Roger's conduct of simply driving under the influence is 
insufficient to award punitive damages under either standard. 
Under Utah law, conduct must be proved which shows intentional 
or deliberate action beyond mere intoxication. 
Rogers further claims that punitive damages should not be 
allowed in this case since he has already been prosecuted crimi-
nally, found guilty and served time in the state prison. The 
underlying purposes of punitive damages: deterrence and punish-
ment, have already been fulfilled. 
Finally, with respect to issues No. 3 and No. 4, relating 
to the claim of Ray C. Johnson for emotional distress, Rogers 
adopts by reference the argument of NAC made in its brief on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT ( 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
{ 
The only evidence in this case concerning Roger's conduct 
in causing the accident is that he was driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol. In that regard, he has admitted that he was 
negligent; that his negligence proximately caused the accident; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and has offered judgment to be taken against him and NAC in the 
amount of $125,000.00. There is no other evidence of culpable 
conduct, such as excessive speed, recklessness, running a stop 
sign or leaving the scene of the accident. Under the law of 
this state and of other states, this bare evidence is insuffi-
cient to warrant an award of punitive damages. 
The controlling Utah law regarding punitive damages has 
been well developed in the briefs of appellants and of NAC; 
these cases will not be recounted here. However, the latest 
decision by this Court, Atkin Wright and Miles vs. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 2 0 Utah Adv. Rptr. 2 0 
(1985), merits consideration as it applies to Rogers. In 
Atkin, the Court synthesized the holdings of prior cases 
regarding punitive damages and stated as follows: 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, 
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is 
willful and malicious. Leigh Furniture 
and Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 
293, 312 (1982); First Security Bank of 
Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 
653 P.2d 591, 598 (1982), Elkmgton v. 
Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980); 
Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354, 
359 (1975), or that manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference and disregard 
for the rights of others. Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 
267, 277-78 (1982); Terry v. Zions Co-
operative Mercantile Institution,Utah, 
605 P.2d 314, 412 (1979). 
Atkins, supra, at 24. 
In the case at hand, NAC contends that actual malice, or 
conduct which manifests a state of mind consistent with inten-
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tional, malicious or a knowing indifference to the rights of 
others, is required. All parties, including the plaintiffs, 
agree that no evidence exists to prove actual malice. The 
appellants assert that reckless indifference to the rights of 
others is sufficient. Rogers disagrees and submits that a 
close reading of Atkins warrants the conclusion that simple 
reckless indifference is insufficient to serve as a basis for 
punitive damages. In Atkins, the Court first noted the re-
strictive use of punitive damages (deterrence) and then com-
bined the elements of willfulness, maliciousness, knowing and 
reckless indifference and disregard to the rights of others as 
the bases for punitive damages. Such a standard implies a 
mental or deliberate element to one's conduct not present even 
in the term "recklessness." One who simply drives under the 
influence does not meet this standard. Cases from other juris-
dictions support this conclusion. In Dillard v. Dillard, 418 
P.2d 839 (Ore. 1966), the plaintiff, a passenger, sued his host 
driver and obtained a judgment for personal injuries. Evidence 
was adduced at trial that the driver was intoxicated. After 
judgment, the defendant filed for and obtained a discharge in 
bankruptcy. He then attempted to have the judgment expunged, 
which was contested by the plaintiff,-who asserted that the 
plaintiff's injuries were maliciously or willfully inflicted, 
which precluded expungement. The Court held for defendant and 
cancelled the judgment, saying that "the mere fact that one 
injures another as a result of driving while intoxicated does 
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not necessarily establish that the injury was maliciously or 
willfully inflicted." Dillard, supra, at 840. 
In Petling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 
208 (1982), a passenger on a motorcycle that was struck by an 
automobile brought a personal injury action against the automo-
bile driver, claiming, among other things, punitive damages 
because the driver was intoxicated. The only evidence ever 
presented at trial to support punitive damages was that the 
defendant was driving under the influence; there were no other 
aggravating circumstances. The Court, on appeal, reviewed 
extensively the circumstances and standards which allow puni-
tive damages in Ohio, including fraud, malice, insult, punish-
ing a guilty party for wicked, corrupt and malignant motive or 
design, wrongful, unlawful and intentional conduct, together 
with recklessness, wantonness and willfulness. The Court then 
stated as follows: 
Something more than mere commission of 
a tort is always required for punitive 
damages. There must be circumstances 
of aggravation or outrage, such as spite 
or malice, or a fraudulent or evil 
motive on the part of the defendant, or 
such a conscious, deliberate disregard 
of the interests of others that his con-
duct may be called willful or wanton. 
Lacking this element, there is general 
agreement that mere negligence is not 
enough, even though it is so extreme in 
degree as to be characterized as "gross,11 
an unhappy term of ill-defined content, 
which occasionally, in a few jurisdic-
tions, has been stretched to include the 
element of conscious indifference to 
consequences, and so to justify damages.11 
Prosser on Torts, 4th ed. (at 9-10). 
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. . . Allowance of punitive damages 
simply because a defendant was intoxi-
cated at the time of an accident, without 
establishing causation and without demon-
strating intention or deliberation 
through, at the least, aggravating cir-
cumstances, virtually would impose strict 
liability for intoxication in negligence 
actions. This would not be in concert 
with our well-developed jurisprudence of 
punitive damages, and we see no 
persuasive reason for taking such a step. 
Detling v. Chockley, supra, at 211. 
Finally, a recent case from the Fourth Circuit is persua-
sive as to the facts at hand, although it does not specifically 
involve one who was intoxicated. In Peacock v. J. C. Penney, 
764 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff's wife was killed 
when she rear-ended a stalled truck, which had been leased by 
the defendant. The driver had encountered mechanical problems 
and had pulled off to the side of the road, but did not post 
flares and did not waive off oncoming traffic. The plaintiff 
established at the trial that the defendant had no safety train-
ing program to train the drivers what to do in the event of a 
breakdown, which was required by law; that the truck had no 
under-ride protection in the back of the truck; and that the 
defendant knowingly misrepresented the fact that the warning 
flashers were on, when in fact they were not. Based on this 
aggravated set of facts, the plaintiff sought punitive damages, 
which the Court denied, stating: 
Exemplary damages are allowable only where 
there is misconduct or malice, or such reck-
lessness or negligence as evidences a 
conscious disregard of the rights of others. 
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But where the act or omission complained of 
is free from fraud, malice, oppression or 
other special motives, or of aggravation, 
damages by way of punishment cannot be 
awarded and compensatory damages are only 
awarded. Baker v. Marcus, infra, at 621. 
(Emphasis added.) 
For additional cases with similar holdings, regarding 
driving under the influence, see: Smith v. Sayles, 637 
S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 
S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1957); Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 
S.E.2d 617 (1960); Eubank v. Spencer, 203 Va. 923, 128 S.E.2d 
299 (1962); Bethel v. Janis, 597 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. S.D. 
1984); Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585 (D.C. App. 1947). 
In the case at hand, respondent Rogers is accused of 
simply driving under the influence. There is no other culpable 
conduct whatsoever which is sufficient to warrant punitive 
damages. 
POINT II 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE WHERE 
THE DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY BEEN PROSECUTED CRIMINALLY. 
The basic purposes of punitive damages are punishment and 
deterrence. These are acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 
1186 (Utah 1983); 
(P)unitive damages are not intended as 
additional compensation to a plaintiff, 
(and) must, if awarded, serve a societal 
interest of punishing and deterring out-
rageous and malicious conduct which is 
not likely to be deterred by other means. 
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See also, Terry v, Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314, 328 (Utah 
1979), overturned for other reasons. 
No Utah law exists on the point of whether punitive damag-
es are allowable after a defendant has been punished criminal-
ly. The law from other jurisdictions is rather old and divid-
ed. See J. Ghiradri and J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law 
and Practice, Sections 5.32-5.33 (1984). Rogers contends that 
the law holding that punitive damages are not recoverable once 
a defendant has been punished criminally should be applied in 
this case. The case law from Indiana is instructive on this 
point. In Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1978) , the plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained in an 
automobile collision. The plaintiff also sought punitive damag-
es on the basis that the defendant was driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol and had left the scene of the accident. The 
defendant moved for summary judgment as to the claim of puni-
tive damages because he had previously been convicted for and 
sentenced on the charge of reckless driving. The lower court 
granted summary judgment on the basis that the criminal convic-
tion barred a claim for punitive damages. The appellate court 
affirmed. In rendering its decision, the Court quoted at 
length from a prior Indiana Supreme Court decision, Taber v. 
Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325 (1854): 
Where the defendant is sued for the com-
mission of a tort, such as slander, an 
offense not the subject of criminal 
punishment, the rule that gives damages 
to punish the offender, may, with some 
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degree of propriety, be applied, because 
it is the only mode in which, by public 
example, the various rights in community 
to personal security and private property 
can, under the sanction of law, be pro-
tected from injury and outrage. In such 
a case, there is wisdom in permitting a 
jury to 'blend together the interest of 
society and of the aggrieved individual.1 
But there is a class of offenses, the 
commission of which, in addition to the 
civil remedy allowed the injured party, 
subjects the offender to a state prose-
cution. To this class, the case under 
consideration belongs; and if the prin-
ciple of the instruction be correct, 
Taber may be twice punished for the same 
assault and battery. This would not 
accord with the spirit of our institu-
tions. The Constitution declares that, 
•no person shall be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense;1 and though that 
provision may not relate to the remedies 
secured by civil proceedings, still it 
serves to illustrate a fundamental prin-
ciple inculcated by every well-regulated 
system of government, viz., that each 
violation of the law should be certainly 
followed by one appropriate punishment 
and no more. 
In the case at hand, Rogers was found guilty of negligent 
homicide, was sentenced to one year in the state prison and, 
thereafter, served one year in a half-way house. Clearly, he 
has been both punished and deterred; thereby fulfilling the 
purposes of punitive damages. 
If this Court should determine, however, that punitive 
damages can be assessed, even though he has been punished crimi-
nally, Rogers then submits that this Court should follow the 
lead of the Supreme Court of Maine, holding that a fact finder 
may consider whether criminal liability has been imposed as one 
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factor in determining whether an award of punitive damages 
would serve a meaningful deterrent function. See Hanover 
Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156 (Me. 1983). See also 
White v. Taylor, 157 Ga. App. 328, 277 S.E.2d 321 (1981). 
The rationale of these cases is applicable when consid-
ered against the backdrop of Utah law governing driving under 
the influence. As noted by the appellants in their brief, Utah 
has one of the most stringent statutes in the nation governing 
drinking and driving. The presumptive level is continually 
being lowered and now is at .08 percent. See Section 41-6-44, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). It is, therefore, 
possible for one to be convicted in Utah under a lower presump-
tive level, where the same person would encounter no difficulty 
in a sister state with a higher presumptive level. Also, the 
Legislature recently enacted the Victim Restitution Fund, which 
mandates that a driver who is convicted of driving under the 
influence must pay $100.00 into the Fund, in addition to the 
fine and possible jail sentence which may be imposed against 
him. See Section 41-25-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). 
Considering the severity of these criminal sanctions, 
which are designed to punish and deter a criminal defendant, it 
is only fair and just for a fact finder to be able to consider 
the criminal penalties already meted out as possible mitigating 
factors in assessing punitive damages in a civil case. 
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CONCLUSION 
In present-day litigation, punitive damages are alleged 
with increasing frequency. A clear standard is required which 
limits their use to situations which are truly egregious. 
Simply driving under the influence is insufficient. Some fur-
ther conduct and/or deliberate action is necessary to award 
punitive damages. Furthermore, punitive damages should not be 
available where a defendant has already paid the price of crimi-
nal sanctions, especially in Utah where the presumptive level 
is low and the sanctions are high. Rogers has paid his debt to 
society. Nothing further by way of deterrence and punishment 
is needed. If the jury is allowed to consider punitive damages 
under these circumstances, the evidence of the criminal penal-
ties should be introduced as mitigating factors. Justice can 
then be done by a jury familiar with all the facts. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 0th day of December, 1985. 
pMz{iV4^-
F. Keith Nelfeon ' 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Donald Rogers 
Suite 7 00 CSB Tower 
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